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The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’, which incorporates traditional military strategies alongside media
and information campaigns, has been a feature of discussions surrounding Russia’s response to the
Ukraine crisis. But if this form of aggressive information warfare is being pursued by the Kremlin
then how should the EU and the West respond in defending its interests? Katarzyna Sobieraj
writes that the key to countering Russia’s information strategy is to strengthen credible and
independent media sources in the EU while resisting the temptation to ‘ﬁght ﬁre with ﬁre’ by
producing pro-EU propaganda in response.
There is a growing anxiety among some observers in the EU that a disinformation strategy pursued by the Russian
government since the Ukraine crisis might fragment and disintegrate the Union. It is claimed that Russia’s use of
targeted disinformation is seeking to inﬂuence public opinion within the member states with the aim of paralysing
decision-making processes at the EU level.
Several examples of Russia’s possible involvement are used to support this hypothesis. These include the recent
referendum in which the Dutch people rejected the ratiﬁcation of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, and the
case of Lisa, a 13-year-old girl of Russian origin allegedly kidnapped and raped by Arabic-speaking men, which
caused massive demonstrations against Angela Merkel’s asylum policy across Germany.
Russia’s disinformation campaign unleashed during the annexation of Crimea is seen as part of its wider
‘information warfare’ and a key element of so called hybrid warfare – the term that refers to a mixture of military
means, support for armed groups, and media campaigns, aimed particularly at Russian-speaking minorities. This
has, under this reading, heightened awareness of the degrading eﬀect of Russian state propaganda on Europe and
highlighted the pivotal role that free and accountable media play in a democratic society.
Russia’s foreign media strategy
How accurate is this reading of events and what really deﬁnes Russia’s media strategy in practice? State media in
Russia have become a core instrument for inﬂuencing public opinion. Misleading coverage has a long history of
being used to generate public approval for the president; however, Moscow has also invested heavily in recent years
in developing media that targets foreign audiences.
The aim of the Russian government is ultimately to develop media that can reach Russian speakers in its “near
abroad” and provide them with the Kremlin’s perspective on global and regional events. Moscow’s determination to
invest in its own media networks was reinforced in the 2000s, immediately following the colour revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia, which were presented as examples of direct US involvement undermining Kremlin-friendly
regimes. From 2013 the Concept of Russia’s Foreign Policy includes media as a tool to inﬂuence foreign public
opinion:
Russia will seek to ensure its objective perception in the world, develop its own eﬀective means of information to
inﬂuence public opinion abroad, strengthen the role of Russian mass media in the international information
environment by providing them with essential state support, as well as actively participate in international
information cooperation, and take necessary measures to counteract information threats to its sovereignty and
security.
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Vladimir Putin visiting Russia Today’s broadcasting centre, 2013. Credits:
Kremlin.ru
As a result, massive expansions were seen in media directed at foreign markets such as the television broadcaster
RT and Sputnik, a network of media platforms, radio
productions, social media, and news agency content
in local languages in 34 countries.
EU media policy
Reliable information that holds all power accountable
is believed to be a cornerstone of democratic society
and a deeply respected European value. But the
evolution of the traditional media model worldwide,
accompanied by the development of modern
information technology, has resulted in vast amounts
of information, often lacking factual accuracy or
presenting intentionally misleading viewpoints, being
made available for citizens. In many countries the
general media environment is dominated by
sensationalism and ‘infotainment’, with opinion often substituted for facts. And this has left an opening for those who
wish to exploit the situation for propaganda purposes.
A variety of tools and methods can be used to attack European values, manipulate the public, undermine the
concept of free, independent and pluralistic media, and to develop and provoke separatist and nationalist attitudes
in the EU’s neighbourhood. The impact of such disinformation is often underestimated and the actions to
counterbalance the disinformation taken at the national and EU level are frequently insuﬃcient.
As Elmar Brok, the Chair of the EP Committee for Foreign Aﬀairs, has stated: “we don’t have an EU media policy
and we cannot have such a uniﬁed media policy because it’s against our principles and our free society. We must
be able to create something which takes that into account but gives clear guidelines.” And the ﬁrst step toward this
has been the establishment within the EEAS of a taskforce, the so called East StratComm Team, with the aim of
monitoring the eastern neighbourhood for cases of disinformation and developing positive narratives to
counterbalance these cases. However, much remains to be done.
How can Europe respond?
Ultimately, the EU’s strategic communication plan should not focus only on Russia and the post-Soviet sphere, but
should also take a broader look at the EU’s neighbourhood and the world. The most eﬀective combination would be
based on four pillars.
First, to foster democracy, one needs to provide audiences with a plurality of views and options. Therefore, more
eﬀort is needed to strengthen the independent media, for instance by supporting independent journalists and
developing capacity-building programmes for media actors. A study by the European Endowment for Democracy
provides detailed proposals of what could be done in this area. Additionally, leading European media should expand
their permanent network of correspondents abroad, which would enable them to report reliably on location and to
counter disinformation with facts.
The second pillar should be to focus on media literacy education and training. This provides knowledge and skills,
empowering the public to use its right to freedom of expression, to interpret media messages, and to react to
disinformation. Only educated audiences are able to properly understand disinformation.
Third, the EU should continue to develop and reinforce its own soft power. Civil society can be empowered by long-
term public and cultural diplomacy actions, such as scholarships and exchange programmes for students and young
professionals, and initiatives supporting intercultural dialogue, promoting cultural links with the EU and common
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heritage.
Last but not least, EU delegations should strengthen their commitment to explaining developments in the EU to the
wider public. The EU must be able to communicate its policies more eﬀectively and in a coherent manner, and
ensure access to information in local languages. Moscow plays on various fears and frustrations of Western
societies and claims its instruments and techniques are as legitimate as the ones employed by the West. To
counterbalance it, the EU should promote its values through partnerships, transparency and education.
Politicians should certainly discuss sanctions against Russia, visas for Russian citizens, and membership prospects
for the EU’s eastern neighbours. But in parallel, the EU can promote its values by reinforcing its own soft power,
developing a coherent and long-term information and cultural diplomacy strategy, and taking steps to improve
pluralism in the media space. And above all, it should be emphasised that in no way can propaganda be countered
with anti-propaganda.
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